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Clinically led commissioning: 
past, present and future?
Kath Checkland, Anna Coleman, Imelda McDermott 
and Stephen Peckham
Introduction
One of the key elements of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 
(HSCA 2012) was the transfer of responsibility for commissioning 
healthcare services from managerially led Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) 
to newly established Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), led 
by General Practitioners (family doctors or primary care physicians, 
generally known as GPs). The 2010 White paper, ‘Equity and 
Excellence’ argued that:
Commissioning by GP consortia [now known as CCGs] 
will mean that the redesign of patient pathways and local 
services is always clinically led and based on more efective 
dialogue and partnership with hospital specialists. It will 
bring together responsibility for clinical decisions and for 
the inancial consequences of these decisions (Department 
of Health, 2010, paragraph 4.4).
The document goes on to acknowledge that this approach is not 
wholly new, arguing that, ‘commissioning never became a real 
transfer of responsibility. So we will learn from the past, and ofer a 
clear way forward for GP consortia’ (Department of Health, 2010, 
paragraph 4.5).
In this chapter we examine that history, and explore what can be 
learnt from previous attempts to involve GPs in commissioning care. 
We will then apply that learning to the provisions of the HSCA 2012, 
highlighting the correspondences and discontinuities between what 
we know from history and what was proposed. We will then go on 
to present evidence from our research on CCGs, exploring what 
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discuss the continuing evolution of health policy in the UK in the 
light of both historical evidence and our current indings. Throughout 
this chapter, the focus is upon GP involvement in commissioning, 
rather than the wider concern of clinician involvement. This is because 
the explicit goal of the HSCA 2012 was to bring GPs back into the 
forefront of commissioning.
Clinically led commissioning: a brief history
This and the subsequent section draw on a comprehensive literature 
review carried out between 2011 and 2014 (Miller et al, 2012; Miller 
et al, 2015), where all the relevant references can be found. Clinical 
involvement in the commissioning of healthcare services started with 
the introduction of the quasi-market into the NHS in 1991. The 
function of purchasing services was separated out from their provision, 
with Health Authorities established as purchasing bodies, responsible 
for assessing population needs and purchasing care from semi-
autonomous NHS Trusts. Needs assessment within Health Authorities 
was led by public health professionals, with managers responsible for 
agreeing and monitoring contracts (Flynn and Williams 1997). At 
the same time, GP practices were invited to take on budgets for some 
aspects of services, notably elective (planned) care and prescribing. This 
was known as GP ‘fundholding’ (GPFH), and over the next ive years 
approximately 50% of GP practices took on GPFH. From 1991–2010, 
GP involvement in what came to be called ‘commissioning’ waxed 
and waned, with successive reorganisations increasing, diminishing and 
reintroducing GP involvement as governments wrestled with problems 
of eiciency, efectiveness and engagement.
Table 8.1 summarises the characteristics of the various GP-led 
commissioning initiatives.
Thus, the nature of GP involvement in commissioning has varied 
over time. In particular, the extent of GP involvement has oscillated 
between leadership (fundholding, Total Purchasing Pilots (TPPs), 
Primary Care Groups (PCGs), CCGs) and a more advisory role 
(Locality Commissioning, Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), Practice-
based Commissioning (PBC)). Each iteration of policy was intended 
to remedy the problems of what went before. Throughout this 
period, however, the ‘programme theories’ underpinning clinical 
commissioning schemes remained the same: irst, that engaged GPs 
would be more likely to be eicient and efective purchasers of services 
for this patients as they would have greater knowledge of patient 












































Clinically led commissioning: past, present and future?
to constrain demand (Mannion 2008; Coleman et al, 2009b). In the 
next section we explore the evidence about how the various initiatives 
played out in practice.
Clinically led commissioning: research evidence
The largest body of evidence available focuses upon GPFH and its 
derivatives, including TPPs. The key research focus was on outcomes, 
with a tendency to focus on the easily measured – for example 
changes to GP prescribing. Few studies focused on how these were 
achieved and whether clinical engagement was an important factor, 
Table 8.1: History of GP-led Commissioning in England





Provision of care split from purchasing, with 
Health Authorities established as purchasers 
of care for geographical populations
GP Fundholding (GPFH) Volunteer GP practices provided with 
budgets to purchase care for their registered 
populations. Budgets covered elective care 
and prescribing
Locality commissioning and GP 
commissioning
A variety of locally developed models of GP 
involvement, with varying degrees of power 
and responsibility
1995 Total purchasing pilots (TPP) An extension of GP fundholding. Volunteer 
groups held a budget covering a range of 
services which was agreed with local Health 
Authority
1997 New Labour government 
elected – GPFH abolished, 
Primary Care Groups (PCGs) 
established
PCGs officially sub-committees of Health 
Authorities. Responsible for commissioning 
full range of services. GP majority on Board
2000 PCGs became Primary Care 
Trusts (PCTs)
Health Authorities abolished, PCTs given 
responsibility for commissioning full range 
of services and providing community 
services. GPs no longer in a majority, few 
GPs involved
2005 Practice-based Commissioning 
(PBC) introduced
Volunteer groups of GPs given indicative 
budgets covering variable range of services. 
Most covered elective services, prescribing 




Coalition government elected, 
announce abolition of PCTs 
and establishment of Clinical 
Commissioning Groups
GP-led organisations with full statutory 
responsibility for commissioning all 
services other than primary care and highly 
specialised services. Fully established by 2012.
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or explored the relationship between clinical leaders and the wider 
body of GPs. Only a small number of studies explore the leadership 
positions clinicians held and the degree of inluence they exerted over 
commissioning decisions. Even fewer studies examined the inluence 
of GP fundholders on other bodies with which they interacted, for 
example the Health Authority (HA) or provider organisations.
Motivations underlying GP involvement in the various types of 
clinically led commissioning vary, depending upon the nature of the 
scheme. Common to all, however, was a belief that GPs, as frontline 
clinicians, bring valuable clinical and patient-speciic knowledge to the 
table, and a desire to innovate. Furthermore, evidence suggests that the 
extent to which GPs felt able to innovate was a key determinant of the 
extent of their engagement. Where autonomy is granted and ‘success’ 
experienced, engagement grows, but where perceived autonomy 
and control is less, GPs tend to disengage. Maintaining wider clinical 
engagement (beyond the leaders) was agreed to be a priority, but the 
extent to which this was achieved varied considerably. Engagement 
was easier in smaller schemes but these tended to be limited in scope, 
while more comprehensive schemes found it more di cult to engage 
with a wider GP community. Engagement was, notwithstanding, 
time-consuming and labour intensive.
In terms of outcomes related to clinically led commissioning, the 
evidence is not strong. The most detailed evidence comes from GPFH 
and TPP, focusing on easy to measure activity such as changes in referral 
patterns, prescribing costs and waiting times. There is some evidence 
that GPFH tended to reduce the rate of growth in both prescribing 
costs and referral rates, although causation cannot be assumed, as those 
practices which took up GPFH tended to difer systematically from 
those which did not. Despite these caveats, however, it seems likely 
that responsibility for a budget tends to make practitioners think more 
carefully about their prescribing and referral decisions, and to focus on 
improving quality of care within their practices, but this does depend 
upon good relationships with frontline GPs, who need to feel that the 
commissioning body has legitimacy and that the actions they are being 
asked to take are reasonable. Peer review by trusted peers seems to 
be an important mechanism underlying this (Coleman et al, 2009b). 
This is easier to achieve in smaller schemes, and can be enabled by 
relatively modest incentive schemes (Checkland et al, 2011). There is 
some evidence that clinically led commissioning of various types led 
to the establishment of a greater range of services in the community, 
such as physiotherapy services, and to the development of better liaison 
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liaison oicers’. Such services were rarely critically assessed for quality 
or costefectiveness, however, with their establishment alone often 
being claimed as a ‘success’. Priorities for service development tended 
to be based upon individuals’ areas of interest or perceived local 
need, rather than a more systematic assessment of needs or service 
gaps. Furthermore, secondary care services tended to resist attempts 
at disinvestment, meaning that many such ‘out of hospital’ services 
represented duplication rather than substitution. There is very little 
evidence of any clinically led commissioning schemes generating 
signiicant changes to secondary care services, although where schemes 
made this their main focus they were able to make some short term 
changes to the pattern of hospital use. There is no evidence to support 
the contention that clinically led commissioning of any kind led to an 
overall improvement in quality of care.
HSCA 2012: what was intended to happen?
The White Paper, ‘Equity and Excellence’ (Department of Health, 
2010) was published early in the life of the new Coalition Government. 
Its contents were generally seen as a surprise, as the Coalition agreement 
had speciically ruled out any signiicant reorganisation of the NHS 
(Cabinet Oice 2010). As has been discussed elsewhere in this volume, 
the White Paper proposed a wholesale reorganisation in which Primary 
Care Trusts would be abolished, with commissioning responsibilities 
split between newly constituted ‘Clinical Commissioning Groups’ 
(CCGs) and a new arms’ length body, initially known as the ‘NHS 
Commissioning Board’ (later renamed NHS England). CCGs would be 
responsible for commissioning secondary care, community and urgent/
emergency services, while NHS England commissioned primary care 
services (including general practice, dentistry, pharmacy, optometry 
and so on) and specialised services. The ‘vision’ underpinning the 
reorganisation was of an NHS that:
t is more transparent, with clearer accountabilities for 
quality and results;
t gives citizens a greater say in how the NHS is run;
t is less insular and fragmented, and works much better 
across boundaries, including with local authorities and 
between hospitals and practices;
t is more eicient and dynamic, with a radically smaller 
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t is put on a more stable and sustainable footing, free from 
frequent and arbitrary political meddling.
(Department of Health 2010, 9)
It was argued that CCGs would ‘shift decision making as close as 
possible to patients’, and ‘build upon the pivotal and trusted role 
that primary care physicians already play’ (Department of Health 
2010, 27). The document sets out the perceived shortcomings of 
previous clinically led commissioning initiatives, and argues that the 
establishment of GP-led CCGs will avoid the problems associated 
with these previous initiatives. Membership of a CCG was to be 
compulsory for all practices, and an ambitious timetable was set out 
with CCGs established in shadow form in 2011, taking over full 
responsibility in April 2013. A series of further documents set out 
more details about the establishment, governance and responsibilities 
of CCGs (Department of Health 2011a; Department of Health 
2011b; Department of Health 2011c; Department of Health 2011d; 
Department of Health 2011e; Department of Health 2011f). It was 
argued that CCGs would be diferent from their predecessors by virtue 
of their status as ‘membership organisations’:
CCGs will be different from any predecessor NHS 
organisation. While statutory NHS bodies, they will be built 
on the GP practices that together make up the membership 
of a CCG. These member practices must decide, through 
developing their constitution, and within the framework of 
legislation, how the CCG will operate. They must ensure 
that they are led and governed in an open and transparent 
way which allows them to serve their patients and population 
efectively. (NHS Commissioning Board, 2012c, 4)
It was also argued that the ‘added value’ that GPs would bring to 
commissioning included:
t strengthened knowledge of the needs of individuals and 
local communities and the variation in the quality of 
local services, by harnessing the unique role of general 
practice to be in everyday contact with patients, their 
families, and carers;
t increased capability to lead clinical redesign and engage 
other clinicians based on the understanding of clinical 
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t better involvement and engagement of local people to 
adopt improved services and move from familiar but 
outdated services based on the focus on quality and 
outcomes and the trusted positions held in communities;
t improved uptake of quality based referral options across 
practices based on greater involvement in priority setting 
and redesign;
t greater focus on improving the quality of primary 
medical care as a key part of clinically led redesign of 
care systems.
(NHS Commissioning Board 2012 paragraph 3.14)
It is instructive to test these claims against what is known from research. 
First, GPFH, TPP and PBC were all underpinned by the idea that 
GPs, as frontline clinicians, understood the needs of their patients. 
Evidence suggests that, in practice, while they were responsive to the 
needs of individuals, clinicians involved in commissioning were not 
necessarily better than their managerial counterparts in assessing wider 
need (Miller et al, 2012). Second, there is little evidence from previous 
clinically led commissioning schemes that GPs are more capable of 
leading large scale service redesign than PCTs. In terms of ‘engagement 
of local people’, those involved with PBC had aspirations to improve 
public engagement, but there is little evidence of signiicant success 
(Coleman et al, 2009a). The suggestion that the ‘trusted position of 
GPs in the community’ would enable them to persuade the public of 
the need to make signiicant changes to services such as signiicantly 
redesigning (or even shutting) hospital services is interesting, and yet 
the counterargument can be made that GPs’ position in the front line 
might make them less likely to support radical service redesign, as 
they would potentially be exposed to any public anger in their day 
to day work. It is certainly true that evidence suggests that referral 
patterns can be inluenced by clinician-led commissioning authorities 
who are perceived to have local legitimacy, and that such groups can 
support peer-led approaches to quality improvement, but neither of 
these necessarily requires the clinical commissioners to hold statutory 
authority.
Taken together, the evidence base underlying these claims to beneits 
associated with the development of CCGs would seem to be weak. 
On the other hand, there is clear evidence from the past that clinician 
engagement in commissioning is more likely to be sustained if they feel 
themselves to have autonomy and freedom to innovate. As statutory 










































page 156 Dismantling the NHS?
156
commissioned, at least in the area of secondary care and community 
services; the extent to which they had freedom to innovate therefore 
depended upon the accountability and management mechanisms 
established in practice.
CCGs: what do we know?
Since 2011 the Policy Research Unit in Commissioning and the 
Healthcare System (PRUComm) has undertaken three phases of 
research on CCGs. The irst phase, from early 2011 through to 
December 2012, followed CCGs from their initial establishment in 
‘shadow’ form, through to their preparations for ‘authorisation’ as full 
statutory bodies. The second phase of the study ran from April 2013 
until March 2015, focusing upon the claims made by participants in the 
research about the ‘added value’ that GPs brought to commissioning. 
Research methods and results from both of these phases of the study 
have been published in academic papers (see above) and in a number 
of reports (Checkland et al, 2012, 2014; McDermott et  al, 2014; 
Miller et al, 2012). The inal phase of this research commenced in 
April 2015, focusing upon the devolution of additional commissioning 
responsibilities to CCGs. In autumn 2014, CCGs were invited to 
express interest in taking on responsibility for commissioning GP 
services. This means holding responsibility for GP practice contracts, 
and raises issues of conlicts of interest as GP-led organisations will 
be commissioning their own practices. Three ‘levels’ of involvement 
were ofered: full delegation of responsibility; joint commissioning, 
with CCGs and NHSE (NHS England) working together; and ‘greater 
involvement’, in which CCGs would advise NHSE on aspects of 
primary care commissioning (NHS England, 2014b). There is a 
clear expectation that those CCGs which opt for a lower level of 
involvement will, over time, move to take on further responsibility, 
but no irm timescale has been set for this.
This section is an updated version of evidence previously published 
as a paper in the British Journal of General Practice (Checkland et al, 
2013b). We are grateful to the journal for permission to reproduce 
this here.
CCG autonomy and decision making: structures and governance
On paper, CCGs have signiicantly more autonomy than any previous 
clinical commissioning organisations, in that they are the statutory 
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we discuss the development of CCGs structures and governance 
procedures, in order to explore how far this autonomy and associated 
ability to make decisions is being realised in practice.
Guidance for CCGs about structures and governance was non-
prescriptive, suggesting only that CCGs should have a ‘Governing 
Body’, which is responsible for ensuring ‘that CCGs have appropriate 
arrangements in place to ensure they exercise their functions efectively, 
eiciently and economically and in accordance with any generally 
accepted principles of good governance that are relevant to it’ (NHS 
Commissioning Board, 2012c, 32), and that they should set up relevant 
subcommittees as required. As a consequence, we found signiicant 
complexity and variety associated with emerging CCG structures and 
governance arrangements, with widely difering subcommittees and 
groups which were referred to using a bewildering variety of names. 
Terms used included: board or shadow board; executive or executive 
committee; clinical commissioning committee; council of members; 
forum; collaborative; locality; cluster; senate; and cabinet. Total 
governing body size as reported in the survey also varied considerably, 
as did membership, with some establishing a relatively small group, 
dominated by GPs, while others opened membership up to a variety of 
other professionals such as social service representatives and public health 
specialists. Smaller groups might ind decision making easier to achieve, 
but at the expense of less engagement with the wider health community.
Over time, there was a developing consensus around use of the title 
of ‘Governing Body’ for the main statutory body, but considerable 
variety remained around the naming of other subcommittees. This 
made direct comparisons di cult, as it was not always clear how far 
bodies in diferent sites with diferent names corresponded to one 
another. In order to overcome these di culties, we sought to identify 
groups by their functions rather than their names. Overall, we found 
the following functions represented in our study sites: an overarching 
‘Governing Body’, holding statutory responsibility once authorisation 
was completed; a number of ‘Operational’ bodies, including a number 
of diferent committees or workstreams; a formally constituted 
operational group, often called an ‘Executive’, which undertakes day 
to day management of the group’s activities; a ‘Council of Members’ 
(CoM), consisting of practice representatives; and ‘Locality groups’, 
consisting of smaller groups of representatives from a geographical 
area. Not all sites had Locality groups, and two had also convened a 
wider group of clinicians, managers and representatives from outside 
(for example, from the local authority or the local provider trust) to 
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Even when it was possible to identify separate groups at each of these 
diferent levels, the distribution of functions in a given site was more 
luid than this typology suggests with, for example, no clear separation 
between Governing Body functions and more operational work, and with 
considerable time spent in meetings discussing who should be responsible 
for which type of decisions. The extent of the complexity embodied in 
these diferent groups and subcommittees is illustrated by this quotation 
from a manager in one of the larger CCGs that we studied:
Well, because we’re a large CCG, if we have everybody…the 
meeting’s going to be, ah, less than, um, eicient. So what I’ve done 
is created a proposal for two boards. One is the statutory board … The 
governing body. And the other is more of a… subsidiary board. So 
you have the locality chairs on one subsidiary board comprised solely 
of GPs, you have a superior board – the oversight and governance 
board – comprised of some GP representatives from the lower board, 
and all those statutory appointees. [Manager, ID 60]
In addition to their complex internal governance processes, CCGs are 
also externally accountable to NHS England and, more indirectly, to 
the local Health and Wellbeing Board (HWB). Thus CCGs, although 
they have complete budgetary control, may be signiicantly constrained 
in their ability to make rapid decisions or act autonomously in practice.
Engagement with members
In a clinical commissioning organisation with decision-making power, 
active engagement of GPs increases the ability to achieve goals and 
to innovate, albeit at a cost of signiicantly increased administrative 
overheads (Miller et al, 2012). In this section we examine evidence 
from our study about GP engagement and involvement.
CCG ‘ownership’
Oicial guidance stressed the importance of GP engagement, explaining 
that: ‘CCGs are also membership organisations, accountable to 
constituent GP practices’ (NHS Commissioning Board, 2012b, 3), and 
suggesting that member practices should be actively engaged with all key 
decisions (NHS Commissioning Board, 2012a). This implies that CCG 
members should see themselves as ‘owners’ of the CCG and of its plans. 
In practice, constitutions, strategic plans and commissioning plans were 
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and then submitted to the wider membership for approval. It is not yet 
clear how far the GP members will see themselves as ‘owning’ these 
plans. The smaller CCGs in our study took this seriously, working hard 
to try to ensure that the wider body of members ‘owned’ the agenda. In 
one site, this issue was revisited in almost every meeting, and Council 
of Members meetings were actively used to engage the members. One 
GP described this process:
We also have a check and balance of the Council of Members….. 
The purpose was one, to hold us to account, but also to feed us 
information about what’s a problem. And you saw with the Mental 
Health Strategy. ’This is wrong’. People giving both speciic 
examples and endorsing broad feelings about how it did … And 
then go back to the provider of that service, and say ’This is what 
everybody is saying about it. What do you think you’re going 
to do to change it?’ So to be at that stage is actually really quite 
exciting because it’s almost showing how we’re going to operate in 
the future. [GP ID 283]
Thus, this GP saw the Governing body as being ‘held to account’ 
by the membership. A manager from a diferent site sees it slightly 
diferently, however, as quoted below, arguing that the Council of 
Members had given the Executive the power to make decisions, 
upon which the wider membership could then comment, rather than 
the wider membership owning the decisions. In other words, the 
Executive would be required to give an account to their membership, 
without necessarily being accountable in a more direct sense:
Yes, that… I suppose that really is they have given the exec team 
responsibility decide, you know, that direction and the plan, so 
your irst signof is with the exec team, but then you take it to 
the wider group to say this is what we’re going to take forward 
…. so it’s just really exposing it to the wider remit as a sort of 
communication exercise really, but also it’s their then chance to say 
you’re all barking up the wrong tree. [Manager ID 42]
Engaging with members
All case study CCGs were in the process of deciding how they should 
engage with their members. Many diferent modes of communication 
and engagement were planned, such as circulated newsletters or 
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represented in our sites. In some (usually smaller) sites, the key task was 
seen as getting grassroots members to engage with strategic planning, 
contributing ideas and ‘owning’ the strategy. In larger groups, the 
problem was more often formulated in terms of the need to disseminate 
information down, so that grassroots members were aware of what 
the CCG was doing. Finally, some fell between these two extremes, 
seeing the strategic role as falling to the Governing Body or executive 
group, but wishing to see a low of ‘frontline intelligence’ up from the 
grassroots, in addition to the low of information down.
To engage with members, ive out of eight of the case study sites had 
established geographically-based ‘locality’ groups. In four of these, the 
Localities form the main forum through which members engage with 
the CCG, with wider membership meetings infrequent. In the ifth 
site, there is also an active Council of Members. Respondents across 
all these sites expressed a desire to have ‘strong Localities’; however, 
it remained unclear what this meant or what a ‘strong Locality’ 
might do. The rationale appeared to be that ‘strong Localities’ were 
necessary to engage the membership, but their ongoing role in the 
wider organisation remained undeined and insecure. One of the key 
questions was how much responsibility could reasonably be delegated 
to Localities. In one of the larger sites it was stated categorically 
that Localities could not work autonomously. In another site, by 
contrast, Localities were given delegated authority to make signiicant 
commissioning decisions, commit speciied amounts of the overall 
budget without Governing Body approval, and even manage contracts 
with their local providers. This approach generated signiicant local 
buy-in and enthusiasm; the downside was that it required a signiicant 
commitment of managerial resources at the local level.
These indings suggest that what it means to ‘engage’ grassroots’ 
GPs in CCGs is yet to be clearly formulated. The meaning of 
‘membership’, the extent to which grassroots’ GPs are expected to 
‘own’ the agenda, the purpose of ‘communication’ and the role of 
Locality groups all need to be more clearly deined. Furthermore, 
it seems that ‘engagement’ may mean diferent things in groups of 
diferent sizes, and that, as was seen in the Total Purchasing Pilots, 
larger groups may ind particular di culties, unless they are able to 
devolve meaningful power to their Localities.
Commissioning activity
Previous GP commissioners have tended to focus upon activity 
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such matters as hospital waiting times and the provision of additional 
community-based services, with limited engagement with a public 
health approach to population health. There is most direct evidence 
of GP commissioner impact on prescribing, improving services in 
primary care, and some limited impact on slowing the rate of increase 
in referrals and urgent or unscheduled care.
Commissioning responsibilities
At the time of the research, emerging CCGs were working as 
subcommittees of their local PCT Cluster, and were beginning to take 
over responsibility for leading commissioning, preparing to take over 
full responsibility from April 2013. Unlike all previous manifestations 
of clinically led commissioning, CCGs have statutory responsibility 
for virtually the entire commissioning budget. Respondents in our 
case study sites were very much aware of the implications of this, and 
of the challenges ahead:
There is no longer going to be a PCT to pick up the pieces. We are 
going to have to hold each other to account (localities and GPs) and 
work hard at this. Localities need to own contracts. We have to look 
at inancial credibility…We need to be on top of things from quarter 
one and decided how we are going to monitor things [Extract from 
ieldnotes executive meeting March 2012 M30]
Some Governing Body members appeared to recognise the need to 
take as broad a view as possible of the commissioning task, moving 
away from small scale, practice-level interventions:
for me it’s really amazing to watch these clinicians leading change 
on a really signiicant scale, and it’s very diferent to, I guess, what 
I thought might happen, after seeing those early stages of practice 
based commissioning, which were, you know, doing a little bit of 
dermatology in your practice, for other practices, it was very small 
scale. [Manager ID 204]
We also found that, in general, meetings of Locality groups and 
Councils of Members tended to remain more focused upon more 
familiar topics such as small scale interventions to improve care for 
long term conditions in general practice.
Engaging with public health will be important if CCGs are to 
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architecture of the NHS, responsibility for public health has moved 
to Local Government authorities. Our case study sites were aware 
of the need to work closely with public health, with, for example, 
some participants acknowledging the diference between ‘formal’ 
public health knowledge and ‘informal’ general practice knowledge 
about health needs. Some sites were keen to ‘embed’ public health 
at Governing Body level, whereas others saw it in terms of public 
health ofering the CCG a service. Respondents in all sites expressed 
concerns about the ongoing relationship between CCGs and public 
health. In the face of this uncertainty, personal experience of working 
together was seen as important:
…at the moment, there’s still quite a good link, historical…with 
the public health and the names and faces are still there, and as 
a consequence what we get is based on those relationships, isn’t 
it; do we have a thorough understanding of what public health 
information we would want contract to be provided to us, I don’t 
know about that, that’s a diicult one. It’s a relationship that, 
hopefully, will just continue. [GP ID 104]
Research suggests that interactions between CCGs and their public 
health colleagues can take a number of diferent forms, with some 
public health professionals seeing themselves as ‘co-owners’ of the 
CCG agenda, while others act as ‘critical friends’ or ‘service providers’ 
(Warwick-Giles et al, in press). The implications of these diferent 
approaches are not yet clear.
One of the key areas in which our case study CCGs told us that 
they felt that CCGs would add value and ‘do things diferently’ from 
previous clinically led commissioning schemes was in the area of 
negotiating with providers:
We’re beginning to see some successes in terms of GPs’ involvement 
in some of the, some of the contracting rounds, so…They actually 
go along to the Contracting meetings. And, you know, and giving 
clinical view and clinical input around some of those discussions 
and conversations. And that can add real value in terms, for both 
the providers and the commissioners, to really start driving forwards 
some of those tricky conversations. [Manager ID 54]
When we followed this up in phase two of our study, however, we 
found that, while interactions between commissioners and providers 
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careful orchestration, with detailed planning, proactive chairing and 
a selective approach as to where to focus clinicians’ attention. This 
is important, as GPs have limited time and are under considerable 
pressure. This GP highlighted the stress he was facing:
And I spent yesterday, six hours in a Joint Strategic Needs 
Assessment on the Health and Wellbeing Board, for which I have 
not been paid, and I won’t get paid. That’s why I am still catching 
up on my clinical work, and I came in at 7 o’clock this morning 
to do all my paperwork and spent till 8 o’clock last night doing 
that. So I spend hours and hours of unpaid work…. doing the 
work that needs to be done. [GP ID 218]
Research by the Kings Fund/Nuield Trust conirms these indings, 
and suggests that GP involvement in CCG Governing Bodies is 
declining (Holder et al, 2015). Deining clearly where GPs ‘add value’ 
will be important if CCGs are to be sustainable.
Quality of primary care
Previous manifestations of clinically led commissioning have had some 
success in improving care quality in general practice. The CCGs in our 
study had ambition in this regard. In particular, there was ambition 
to undertake some kind of performance management, including 
performance against commissioning budgets, referral behaviour and 
prescribing costs. While oicial documents refer to ‘improving quality’ 
in primary care, most of our respondents were happy to talk explicitly 
about ‘performance management’. Box 8.1 sets out the approaches seen.
Box 8.1: Approaches to quality improvement in primary care 
adopted by case study sites
 Sharing of named referral performance data (all sites)
 Sharing of named prescribing performance data (all sites)
 Sharing of named data detailing performance against budgets (some sites)
 Incentive schemes designed to target and improve performance (some sites)
 Visits to individual practices to discuss performance (some sites)
 Discussions of audit data in all practice meetings (some sites)
 Creation of intranet (dashboard) where data can be shared between 
practices (some sites)
 Referral management centre scrutinising all GP referrals (one site)
 ‘Buddying’ poorly performing practices with those doing better for 
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In all sites, performance management activities similar to these 
had been running under previous structures such as Practice-based 
Commissioning (Coleman et al, 2009b). Some respondents, however, 
said that they were concerned that such performance review and 
management would be more di cult in future as they had fewer staf 
to do the work; in particular, visiting practices individually is very 
labour intensive and may not be possible. In addition, there was some 
tension identiied between the desire to be a ‘bottom up’ organisation 
led by members and the perceived need to performance-manage those 
members.
How these tensions play out as CCGs take over responsibility 
for commissioning primary care services will be an important 
determinant of success. CCGs must maintain the trust and support 
of their members, while actively managing their performance and, 
potentially, enforcing local contract changes. The third phase of our 
research will explore the experiences of CCGs as they take over these 
new responsibilities.
Conclusions
If the split between ‘commissioning’ and ‘providing’ services is to be 
maintained, it seems clear that GP involvement is important. GPs in 
the UK are ‘gatekeepers’ to secondary care services, and, via their 
registered lists, are closely in touch with the health needs of the public. 
How best to involve GPs, however, is a question to which successive 
governments have provided diferent answers. The HSCA 2012 sought 
to give GP-led organisations statutory responsibility for a signiicant 
proportion of the commissioning budget. The argument underlying 
the abolition of PCTs was that they were too managerially dominated 
and had failed to engage GPs efectively. The solution – a signiicant 
reorganisation – contained some elements that seemed in keeping 
with available evidence. In particular, the HSCA 2012 seemed to 
promise signiicant autonomy to CCGs, with GPs irmly in the lead. 
In practice, however, their room for manoeuvre has been constrained 
by the inancial challenges afecting the NHS as a whole, and it is not 
yet clear the extent to which CCGs will be able to make the signiicant 
service changes necessary to meet those challenges.
Since 2014, policy has moved forward rapidly. Simon Stevens took 
over as Chief Executive of NHS England, and quickly published 
his ‘Five Year Forward View’ (FYFV) (NHS England, 2014a). This 
document set out the scale of the inancial challenge facing the NHS, 
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things diferently. In particular, the FYFV advocates the establishment 
of what have come to be called ‘vanguards’ to test out new models 
for services. These include: Multispeciality Community Providers, 
bringing together providers of a variety of types of care in community 
settings; Primary and Acute Care Systems, vertically integrating 
primary and secondary care; Urgent and Emergency Care networks, 
bringing together providers of diferent types of urgent care across 
a geographical area; and a variety of other models focusing upon 
speciic care settings such as care homes, community hospitals and 
maternity services. In addition, as discussed earlier, Simon Stevens 
suggested that the commissioning of primary care services would be 
delegated to CCGs. Taken together, these developments suggest a 
future for commissioning in general and CCGs in particular that will 
look quite diferent. The new models of care under development 
suggest a situation in which, rather than assessing needs and procuring 
services, commissioners set agreed outcomes and hold large providers 
to account for meeting them. CCGs seem to be stimulating the 
development of provider ‘federations’ (Welikala, 2015), in which 
groups of general practices work together as providers across a larger 
footprint, and this brings potential conlicts of interest.
How these developments will play out in the longer term is 
currently unclear, with many questions remaining about the status 
of CCGs as membership organisations, the extent to which they can 
hold large providers to account and their management of conlicts 
of interest. The direction of travel – towards a greater focus on care 
provision in community settings – is supported by the evidence that 
we have presented here from the long history of GP involvement in 
commissioning.
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